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Oil is a very important resource for Nigeria, as it remains the major economic
driver and mainstay of the country. The unsustainable management of Nigeria’s
oil wealth, rather than the availability of oil itself, remains the real cause of
the challenges confronting the economic performance of the country. This
article contributes to the debate on how Nigeria can develop more coherent
and sustainable practices in the management of its oil wealth. It examines
how policies and rules of law that promote mismanagement, corruption,
waste and the fixation with the sharing of oil revenues at the expense of
production are unsustainable and unethical practices that may continue to
stifle sustainable development in Nigeria. The article discusses the need for
stronger legal regimes for the efficient management of Nigeria’s oil wealth,
and identifies the roles that active stakeholder engagement, such as the Nigerian
public and civil society organizations (CSOs) should play.
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The spirit of a people, its cultural level, its social structure, the
deeds its policy may prepare – all this and more is written in its
fiscal history, stripped of all phrases. He who knows how to listen
to its message here discerns the thunder of world history more
clearly than anywhere else,1 [and recognizes the inevitability of]
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1 J. A. Schumpeter, quoted in I. W. Martin, A. K. Mehrotra and M. Prasad, ‘The
Thunder of History: The Origins and Development of the New Fiscal Sociology’ in I.
W. Martin, A. K. Mehrotra and M. Prasad, The New Fiscal Sociology: Taxation in
Comparative and Historical Perspective (eds) (Cambridge University Press 2009) 1.
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[t]he present that was the future in society’s past [becoming] ...
the past of society’s next future.2
1.  INTRODUCTION
This article begins with an epigraph by Joseph Schumpeter and Philip
Allot which could serve as a mantra for the ‘fiscal sociological
scholarship’3 on the sustainable management of Nigeria’s oil wealth.
The article does not attempt to underplay the contributions of non-oil
sectors to the Nigerian economy.4 However, oil remains a very important
resource for Nigeria and its major economic driver.5 There is even the
claim that oil is at the core of Nigeria’s corporate existence as its social,
economic and political milieu revolves around crude oil.6 This raises
the question whether the political and economic history of Nigeria
would have been different if oil were discovered a decade earlier or
not discovered at all. Inherent in this notion is a sad commentary as
‘[t]he idea is essentially repulsive of a society held together only by
relations and feelings arising out of pecuniary interest.’7
There is also the notion that oil resource can be an excellent key to
unlocking social change; and that is a strong motivation for this article.
This idea derives from the realization that oil contributes huge revenues
to the Nigerian State. The revenues should be exchanged for other
2 P. Allot, ‘Reconstructing Humanity: New International Law’ (1992) 3 E.J.I.L
219, 224.
3 E.S. Lieberman, ‘The Politics of Demanding Sacrifice: Applying Insights from
Fiscal Sociology to the Study of AIDS Policy and State Capacity’ in I. W. Martin, A.
K. Mehrotra and M. Prasad, The New Fiscal Sociology: Taxation in Comparative
and Historical Perspective (eds) (Cambridge University Press 2009) 101.
4 The solution to Nigeria’s economic non-performance appears to be beyond
economics per se, as the country’s seem to have defied economic rules and
principles.  See O. Famuyiwa, ‘The Nigerian Financial Crisis: A Reductionist
Diagnosis’ (2013) 2 (1) Afe Babalola University: Journal of Sustainable
Development Law and Policy36-64.
5 L. N. Chete et al, ‘Industrial Development and Growth in Nigeria: Lessons and
Challenges’ (Learning to Compete, Working Paper No. 8, Nigerian Institute of




7 J. S. Mill, Principles of Political Economy with Some of the Applications to Social
Philosophy (W Ashley (ed)7th edn, Longmans, Green and Co. 1909) 754.
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public goods and services, for public finance has an institutional basis
for modernity and progress.8 Therefore, it is the best starting point for
an investigation of Nigeria’s9 social, economic and political life.
However, the unsustainable manner in which Nigeria’s oil wealth has
been managed over the years has made life unbearable for the millions
of vulnerable citizens – those who live below the poverty line. Chinua
Achebe once observed that living life without having the things with
which to live it well is akin to ‘a kind of slow and weary life which is
worse than death.’10 This suggests that the sustainable management of
Nigeria’s resource-based wealth entails that conditions of poverty and
inequality will be alleviated. Moreover, the failure to do so would render
the concept of sustainable development meaningless, as the concept
encompasses ‘development as well as sustainability.’11 According to
Martin Holdgate, to understand development is to recognize the
potential of resources.12 Therefore, the recognition of the link between
development and sustainable resource management should be seen as
imposing a normative obligation on the Nigerian State as the provider
of social protection in its capacity as ‘the contemporary parens patriae’,13
as distinct from the ethical necessity not to transfer the burden of the
failure of the present generation to future generations. Despite the
link that may exist between oil resource and economic development,
there is the problem of disconnect in the dynamic relationship between
the citizens and the Nigerian State as ‘[t]axation is perhaps the only
[S]tate policy that can be counted on to generate frequent resistance
throughout history and all over the world.’14
The question may then be asked: What amounts to sustainable
management of Nigeria’s oil wealth? Sustainability denotes the ability
to create ‘the possibility for achieving overall well-being for the present
8 Martin, Mehrotra and Prasad (n 1) 5.
9 J. S. Mill quoted in Martin, Mehrotra and Prasad (n 1) 2.
10 Chinua Achebe, Arrow of God (Heinemann Ltd 1989) 95.
11 R. Ciegis, J. Ramanauskiene and B. Martinkus, ‘The Concept of Sustainable
Development and its Use for Sustainability Scenarios’ (2009) 2 Inzinerine
Ekonomika-Engineering Economics 28, 29.
12 M. W. Holdgate, ‘The Sustainable Use of Tropical Coastal Resources: A Key
Conservative Issue’ (1993) 22 AMBIO, 481-482
13 . Famuyiwa, ‘Forum Issues in the Enforcement of Regulatory Obligations of the
Nigerian Public Companies’ (2015) 5 (1) Afe Babalola University: Journal of
Sustainable Development Law and Policy 72, 74.
14 Martin, Mehrotra and Prasad (n 1) 2-3.
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and the future generations’ of society.15 It can also be described in
terms of long-term and continuous satisfaction of human needs through
rational usage and replenishment.16 The essence of the concept of
sustainability is the creation of social and economic systems which
have the capacity to support an increase in real income, the improvement
of the level of education, improvement in the health of the population
and the general quality of life, as they constitute the ‘ethical ideal and
normative ethical principle for the further development of the society,
that speaks not about the way it is but the way it should be’.17 Therefore,
sustainable management of Nigeria’s oil wealth should involve a holistic
system that can develop towards greater benefits for the citizens,
increased efficiency in resource utilization and inter-generational equity.
It postulates resource management systems which are capable of
satisfying the needs of the present generation without depriving future
generations of satisfying their own needs,18 based on preferred
development models of the State which must commit to improved
economic performance of society through interventions and directions
and for sustained economic growth.19
This article argues that oil is not the problem of the Nigerian State
but the unsustainable manner in which the oil wealth has been managed
over the years. The article focuses on some policy and legal issues,
which pertain to sustainability in relation to the enormous oil revenues
collected by the Nigerian State. It also identifies issues pertaining to
leakages of oil resources, which translate into huge losses in oil
revenues. Both categories of challenges are occasioned by policies and
political enterprises, which are permitted by the absence of sound legal
regimes. Arguably, the unsustainable management of Nigeria’s oil wealth
is a phenomenon that gives rise to what Michael Ross described as a
15 R. Ciegis, J. Ramanauskiene and B. Martinkus (n 11) 30.
16 Damilola Olawuyi, Principles of Nigerian Environmental Law (Afe Babalola
University Press, 2015) 1-15; also Declaration of the UN Conference on
Environment and Development, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1, Report of the
UNCED vol. 1 (New York) [Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,
1992].
17 Ciegis, Ramanauskiene and Martinkus (n 11) 30.
18 The World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future
Oxford University Press 1987).
19. S. Ghebremusse, ‘New Directions in African Developmentalism: The Emerging
Developmental State in Resource-Rich Africa’  (2016) 7 (1) Afe Babalola
University.  J. of Sust. Dev. Law & Policy1, 9.
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‘disappointingly average’ economic performance. This results from the
failure of the Nigerian State to use the gains from oil resources to
generate economic opportunities for its citizens, stimulate the growth
of per capita income, as well its inability to surmount the challenges
created by oil revenue volatility.20
It has been suggested that many resource-rich African States lack
the character of a developmental State.21 This argument applies to
Nigeria, as the sustainable management of its oil wealth has become
notoriously problematic.22 To this extent, this article examines some
of the factors that exacerbate the unsustainable management of the
nation’s oil wealth.
The article is divided into seven sections. After this introduction,
section 2 provides a review of some social and economic challenges
confronting the Nigerian society despite its vast oil and gas endowment.
Section 3 identifies the inadequacy of legislation in the regulation and
management of the country’ soil wealth, and the social implications
for the country. Section 4 adopts the politico-historical analysis to
examine the impact of revenue allocation on the sustainable
management of Nigeria’s oil revenues. Section 5 examines the high
cost of governance in the country through the prism of wasteful and
corrupt policies. In section 6, the future direction for the sustainable
management of Nigeria’s oil wealth is examined. Section 7 is the
conclusion.
2.  THE OIL BLESSING OR CURSE: SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF OIL WEALTH
MISMANAGEMENT IN NIGERIA
There is a large body of literature on the history of oil in Nigeria.23
20 M. L. Ross, The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of
Nations (Princeton University Press 2012) 13.
21 Ghebremusse (n 19) 22-23.
22 M. Watts, ‘Resource Curse? Governmentality, Oil and Power in the Niger Delta,
Nigeria’ (2004) 9 (1) Geopolitics 50.
23 For an historical account of oil in Nigeria, see D. Olawuyi, Principles of Nigerian
Environmental Law (Afe Babalola University Press 2015) 1-30; Y. Omorogbe,
Oil and Gas Law in Nigeria (Malthouse Press Limited 2001) 16-9; K. S. A. Ebeku,
Oil and the Niger Delta Peoples in International Law: Resource Rights,
Environmental and Equity Issues (OGEL Special Study – Vol 5, Alexander’s Gas
& Oil Connections and Oil, Gas & Energy Law Intelligence, February 2005) 88-
102.
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Therefore, this subject will not be examined in this article. It is
important to underscore the social and economic challenges of poverty,
unemployment and the dearth of social infrastructure which confront
Nigeria, the biggest oil exporter with the largest natural gas reserves in
Africa24 and one of the largest in the world. Industry records show that
Nigeria has ‘an estimated 159 trillion cubic feet of proven natural gas
reserves’,25 which is mostly flared due to an acute lack of utilization
infrastructure. Statistical data related to gas flaring is unreliable, but it
is estimated that Nigeria loses US$ 18.2 million daily due to gas flaring.26
This is in addition to the environmental damage associated with the
practice.27 According to the World Bank, Nigeria accounts for about 12
percent of the total gas flared in the world. One projection by the
United States (US) Energy Information Administration places Nigeria’s
oil reserves between 16 and 22 billion barrels. Yet, Nigerian policy
makers continue to act as though oil resource will endure forever.
The social and economic challenges confronting the Nigerian society
have been attributed largely to the unsustainable management of the
revenues from oil resource.28 The end of the civil war in 1970 coincided
with the rise in global oil price. However, Nigeria failed to use the
revenues from the so-called ‘oil boom’ efficiently. As this article argues
in section 5, government’s expenditures (not on social and economic
infrastructure) continue to expand significantly faster than the economy.
This inverted process is encouraged, for example, by the unnecessary
expansion of the bureaucracy which results in bloated administrative
centres with little or no corresponding social and economic
development to show for it, and the mismanagement, waste, and
corruption in the governing process. It has been argued that the increase
24 The World Bank, ‘Nigeria: Overview’ (30 September 2015) <www.worldbank.
org/en/country/nigeria/overview> accessed 21 August 2016.
25 Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, ‘Development of Nigeria’s Oil
Industry’<www.nnpcgroup.com/NNPCBusiness/BusinessInformation/
OilGasinNigeria/DevelopmentoftheIndustry.aspx> accessed 23 July 2015.
26 Online Nigeria Portal, ‘Nigeria – Natural Gas’<www.onlinenigeria.com/links/
petradv.asp?blurb=486> accessed 21 July 2015.
27 Gbemre v SPDC (Suit No. FHC/B/CS/53/05, 14 November 2014) [Unreported].
28 Damilola S. Olawuyi, Principles of Nigerian Environmental Law (Afe Babalola
University Press, 2015) 15-40. See also Damilola S.Olawuyi, ‘The Increasing
Relevance of Rights-Based Approaches to Resource Governance in Africa:
Shifting from Regional Aspiration to Local Realization’ (2015) 11 (2) McGill
International Journal of Sustainable Development Law and Policy 293-338.
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in administrative centres, as demonstrated in the creation of new states
from the existing ones was a deliberate policy to address the
marginalization of ethnic minority groups in Nigeria as well as promote
economic development.29 This policy has since been jettisoned as
evident in its ideological reversal.30 This argument is difficult to accept,
as the creation of new states in Nigeria appears to be a means of
distributing what is often called the national cake.31
Very little is known about how much oil is actually produced in
Nigeria. This is a highly secretive issue, which has given rise to corrupt
practices and or resource capture, especially in the offshore operation
of the oil and gas sector.32 Nigeria is known to have one of the world’s
richest deep-water oil reserves. Regrettably, details from the leaked
Panama Papers reveal how oil revenues from Nigeria’s offshore
production disappear.33 It is also on record that the sum of US$ 12.4
billion, part of the revenues, which accrued from oil transactions
between 1988 and 1992, has never been properly accounted for. This
is what gave rise to the 2012 case of Socio-Economic Rights Action
Project & Ors v Governor, Central Bank of Nigeria & Attorney General of
the Federation, a suit filed at the Federal High Court, Abuja, by six
CSOs under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules
2009.
In its judgment, the Court held that the plaintiffs lacked the locus
standi to institute the case. It also held that Socio-Economic Rights
29 Ebeku (n 23) 58.
30 As ‘the creation of states has ceased to be solely a response to minority problem
and has become a means of the majority groups trying to adjust again in order
to square up.’ See Constituent Assembly Debates, 16 March 1978, col. 6764.
31 K. Panter-Brick (ed), Soldiers and Oil: The Political Transformation of Nigeria
(Frank Cass 1978) 5, wherein it was argued that ‘[a] greater share of the
federally distributed revenues could be obtained simply by multiplying the
number of units of government, each of which could then claim its equal share
of the national cake.’ This situation, according to W Graf, The Nigerian State:
Political Economy, State, Class and Political System in Post-Colonial Era (James
Curry 1988) 139, ‘developed in the context of the oil boom of the 1970s
[when] groundnuts, cotton, cocoa, palm oil etc. ... were replaced by a common
dependence on oil revenues.’
32 Y. Alli, ‘Ex-Head of State, Others Named in N1.09b Oil Deal’ The Nation (Abuja,
29 August 2016) 1, 6.
33 K. Sharife, ‘How Nigeria’s Lucrative Oil Profits Disappear’ ANCIR (2016)
<panamapapers.investigativecenters.org/Nigeria-oil/> accessed 3 August
2016.
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Action Project (SERAP) and other CSOs failed to prove the existence
of consolidated and special accounts in the Central Bank of Nigeria
(CBN) into which the proceeds from the said sale of oil was paid. The
Court further held that the CSOs failed to prove how the existence of
such a consolidated account in the CBN infringed on their fundamental
human rights, noting that their action amounted to being busy bodies.
Decisions of this nature by courts of law, which have tenaciously held
on to formalistic and legalistic interpretations of the law, are replete in
Nigeria where the courts question the rights of citizens to demand
transparency and accountability in governance. With due respect to
the Court, it is submitted that where the government fails in the
provision of adequate public goods to the citizens, to the extent that
CSOs and private citizens engage in their provision or contribute to
social welfare services, they should have the moral and legal rights to
advocate on behalf of the citizens who are deprived and denied social
services,34 irrespective of anachronistic provisions of the law.
By mid-2001, it is reported that Nigeria’s crude oil production
averaged 2.2 million barrels per day and there were plans to increase
production to between 3 million and 4 million barrels per day by 201035
and 2015, respectively. Notable is the claim that production stagnated
around 2.1 million barrels per day as of 2014. Ranging at about 73 per
cent, Nigeria has been described as one of the countries with the highest
government take from oil production.36 Government take is the
percentage of net revenue from the production of crude oil received by
the State. It is estimated that Nigeria generated approximately US$
340 billion from oil between 1956 and 2006,37 and allegedly lost about
US$ 380 billion between 1960 and 1999. Moreover, it is estimated
34 R. Ako and E. O. Ekhator, ‘The Civil Society and the Regulation of the Extractive
Industry in Nigeria’ (2016) 7 (1) J. of Sust. Dev. Law & Policy (Afe Babalola
University) 183, 186.
35 However, this has not been feasible as the figures provided by the Nigerian
National Petroleum Corporation, the Central Bank and the accountant general
of the Federation show that oil output and exports have been in steady decline
since 2010. See The World Bank, Nigeria Economic Report (No. 2 July 2014) 5.
36 The figure for Ghana is 52 per cent, Karzakhstan 61 per cent, Russia 65 per
cent, United Arab Emirates 77 per cent and Angola 83 per cent. See P Atuanya
and O. Bello, ‘PIB: Critiques Outline Concerns’ Business Day (Lagos, 23 July
2012) 4.
37 R. Ako and N. Uddin, ‘Good Governance and Resource Management in Africa’
in F. N. Botchway (ed), Natural Resource Investment and Africa’s Development
(Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd 2011) 37.
2016 SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT OF NIGERIA’S OIL WEALTH 143
that as much as US$ 4 billion to US$ 8 billion has been lost to political
corruption annually since the return to civilian rule in 1999.38 The funds
lost to graft are largely proceeds from oil transactions.
Regrettably, despite its huge oil endowment, more than half of
Nigeria’s population of over 170 million live in poverty.39 At the national
level, for example, statistics show that for 2004 and 2010, relative
poverty measurement stood at 54.4 per cent and 69 per cent, and
absolute poverty at 54.7 pe r cent and 60.9 per cent. The population of
Nigerians living on less than a dollar per day stood at 51.6 per cent and
61.2 per cent in those  respective years.40 If the rebasing of the country’s
Gross Domestic Products (GDP) in 2015 is anything to go by, the amount
for determining the poverty line now stands at US$ 1.4 per day.41
In the Niger Delta, Nigeria’s centre of oil exploration and
production, majority of the people live in extreme poverty and
horrendous conditions despite the wealth extracted from their lands
and waters.42 According to one projection by Amnesty International,
38 ibid 337-8.
39 Central Intelligence Agency, ‘Nigeria – Economy’ in The World
Factbook<www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/
ni.html> accessed 22 January 2016; BBC News, ‘Nigerians Living in Poverty
rise to 61 %’ (13 February 2012) <www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-
17015873> accessed 24 March 2014.
40 National Bureau of Statistics, ‘The Nigeria Poverty Profile Report 2010’ (13
February 2012) 5,  <www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/> 14 February 2014. Sadly,
since the publication of this report in 2012, no other such report has been
released by the National Bureau of Statistics. Rather, it released a report on the
growth of the Nigerian economy in 2014 after it rebased to have a Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) of US$ 510 billion, in a manner that suggests that
economic growth equals socio-economic development. Cf The World Bank (n
36) 1, notes that ‘a large number of Nigerians are clustered around the poverty
line, implying a high degree of vulnerability for large part of the population.’
41 The World Bank (n 36) 17.
42 Despite the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) Report on the
Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland, commissioned by the federal
government of Nigeria, it was only on 5 August 2015 that the government
approved the implementation of the recommendation on the rehabilitation of
the environment component of the report. Other recommendations in the
report include the creation of Ogoni restoration authority, creation of
environmental restoration fund for Ogoniland, Coordination of multi-stake
holders efforts, institutional and regulatory reforms, emergency measures in
drinking water and health, environmental and health monitoring, oil spill
contingency planning, preventive pipeline surveillance, etc. It is important to
note that government immediately began the implementation of the preventive
pipeline surveillance because of the implications for the government revenue,
however, the other recommendations have not received equal amount of priority.
144 AFE BABALOLA UNIVERSITY:  J. OF SUST. DEV. LAW & POLICY VOL. 7: 2: 2016
70 per cent of the over six million people in the Niger Delta live on less
than US$ 1 per day.43 Studies have shown that many villages in the
region do not have electricity and drinkable water. Many children do
not have access to school or medical facilities. For a sizeable number
of the population, clean drinking water is difficult to come by,44 and
the rate of unemployment is over the roof. This people lack the required
work skills to benefit from the oil installations right about them, so
most of the plum jobs in the oil industry go to people from outside the
local area. The magnitude of the socio-economic crisis thus created
later compelled the productive segment of the community to resort to
socially destructive ‘employment’ as a means of livelihood45 and to hit
back at the parasitic social order in the country. It has been strongly
and persistently argued that these social and economic conditions are
functions of mismanagement, waste and ineffective policy actions/
inactions as well as corruption.
Some commentators have argued that the resurgence of militant
groups in the Niger Delta since 2006 is a consequence of the horrendous
social conditions of the area.46 This state of affairs has turned the Niger
Delta to one of the most militarized zones in the country. It has also
reduced Nigeria’s oil production capacity and revenues drastically and
disrupted investments in the oil and gas industry. This explains why
the federal government was forced on 25 June 2009 to adopt an
unconditional amnesty policy to enable the militant youths exchange
their weapons for financial rewards and/or educational/vocational
training. The arrangement has been described as a political bribe given
to the oil communities to keep the oil flowing. As expected, three
years before the Amnesty Programme was launched, the crisis in the
Niger Delta had cost the Nigerian State an estimated sum of US$ 20
billion in revenues and infrastructure losses.47
43 Amnesty International, ‘Nigeria: Oil, Poverty and Violence’ (2006) <http://
webamnesty.org/library/index/ENGAFR440172006?open&of=ENG-NGA>
accessed 22 November 2014.
44 Ebeku (n 23) 227.
45 R. Boele, H. Fabig and D. Sheeler, ‘Shell, Nigeria and the Ogoni: A Study in
Unsustainable Development: I. The Story of Shell, Nigeria and the Ogoni People
– Environment, Economy, Relationships: Conflict and Prospects for Resolution’
(2001) 9Sustainable Development 74-86.
46 Watts (n 22) 50.
47 The Nigerian Voice, ‘Counting the Gains of the Amnesty Programme’ (15
February 2012) <www.thenigerianvoice.com/nvnews/82773/1/counting-the-
gains-of-the-amnesty-programme.html> accessed 17 July 2015.
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Ironically, sixty years after crude oil was discovered in Nigeria, oil
activities continue to dominate the economy and revenues, accounting
for US$ 41.8 million of the total value of export of US$ 45.3 million,48
and for about 90 per cent and 80 per cent of the country’s gross earnings
and budgetary revenues, respectively.49 It is even more worrisome that
Nigeria, a country which produces millions of barrels of crude oil daily,
lacks the capacity to refine enough crude oil to meet its local demand
of less than 500,000 barrels per day. This puts Nigeria in the shameful
position of being a major oil exporter and a major importer of refined
oil.50
3.  LAWS GOVERNING THE MANAGEMENT OF
NIGERIA’S OIL WEALTH
There is a plethora of legislations that seeks to regulate the oil and gas
industry in Nigeria.51 Notably, however, there is no law that states how
Nigeria’s oil wealth should be managed, except as provided in the
Nigeria Sovereign Investment Authority (Establishment, etc.) Act 2011
(NSIA Act),52 which stipulates that revenues from oil sold above
budgetary benchmark should be transferred to three Funds established
48 Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, ‘Nigeria: Facts and Figures’
(2016)<www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/167.htm> accessed 7 August
2016.
49 N. Ayoola-Daniels, Nigerian Laws, Cases and Materials on Oil and Gas Vol. 1
(Petgas Global Consulting Limited 2008) xxvii; see also The World Bank, Nigeria
Economic Report(n 36) 5.
50 This phenomenon is referred to as the ‘Dutch Disease’, a concept coined by The
Economist (26 November 1977) 82-3, after the Netherland’s poor management
of its natural gas wealth in the 1960s. The concept explains the relationship
between the exploitation of natural resources and the productive sectors of the
economy. It claims that as revenue inflows from a natural resource (for example
petroleum) increases, the productive sectors (such as manufacturing and
agriculture) become less competitive. In countries with petroleum resources,
the policy of oil revenue-funded spending discourages genuine private sector
investments and may result in long term effects of counter-productivity. See S
Griffith-Jones and J. A. Ocampo, ‘Sovereign Wealth Funds: A Developing Country
Perspective’ (paper presented at the workshop on Sovereign Wealth Funds,
London, February 2008) 18-19.
51 For a compendium of oil and gas legislation in Nigeria, see generally, Ayoola-
Daniels, Nigerian Laws, Cases and Materials on Oil and Gas Vol. 1 (n 50).
52 Cap N166 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004.
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under the NSIA Act.53 In spite of this avoidable lacuna, the Petroleum
Industry (PIB) Bill designed to serve as an omnibus legislation providing
a ‘holistic legal and regulatory framework for the [management of]
Nigeria’s oil and gas industry’,54 has suffered repeated setbacks at the
National Assembly since 2009.
In monetary terms, the failure to pass a law in the mould of the
PIB has resulted in the loss of ‘about US$ 37 billion in private sector
investments in the oil and gas industry’55 between 2010 and 2015, and
an aggregated loss of over US$ 15 billion annually to the Nigerian
State.56  In sharp  contrast, Ghana, which only recently commenced
crude oil exploration and production, has enacted its Petroleum
Production and Exploration Act 2016 to replace its earlier statute of
1984. According to Ghana’s energy minister, Emmanuel Buah, the 2016
Petroleum Production and Exploration Act would create an enabling
as well as an attractive environment for potential investors in the oil
and gas sector and provide certainty and transparency in the rules for
their operations.57
Concerning the general legal framework for the management of
Nigeria’s oil wealth, there are the Constitution of the Federal Republic
of Nigeria 1999 (as amended)58 and the obsolete Petroleum Act59 to
rely on. The Constitution, which is the ultimate law governing oil in
Nigeria, merely vests the legal ownership, management and control of
oil and natural gas in the federal government of Nigeria to be managed
in a manner as determined by Acts of the National Assembly. However,
the Constitution does not provide a detailed management framework
53 E. Solomon, ‘Legal and Constitutional Evaluation of the Nigerian Sovereign
Wealth Fund’ (2015)5(1)  Journal of Sustainable Development Law and Policy
(Afe Babalola University) 101, 105-111.
54 R. Ako and E. O. Ekhator (n 35) 183, 197.
55 R. Kulasingam et al, ‘Nigeria: Outlook for the Nigerian Oil and Gas Market’
Mondaq (16 September 2015). <www.mondaq.com/Nigeria/x/427554/
Oil+Gas+Electricity/Outlook+For+ The+Nigerian+Oil+And+Gas+Market>
accessed 22 August 2016.
56 As noted by Ibe Kachikwu, minister of state for Petroleum Resources. See F.




58 Cap C23 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (LFN) 2004 [hereinafter the
Constitution or the Nigerian Constitution].
59 Cap P10 LFN 2004, s 1 (1).
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for the administration of Nigeria’s oil wealth. The responsibility to
fashion a comprehensive management framework for the revenues from
oil and gas resources has been left to the National Assembly. For the
purpose of clarity, the constitutional provision on the management
and control of crude oil is reproduced below:
[T]he entire property in and control of all minerals, mineral gas
in and under or upon any land in Nigeria or in, under or upon the
Territorial Waters and the Exclusive Zone of Nigeria shall vest in
the [g]overnment of the Federation and shall be managed in such
manner as may be prescribed by the National Assembly.60
Currently, the National Assembly has failed or refused to exercise
its constitutional power despite the notable mismanagement, waste
and attendant corrupt practices and processes, which the Nigerian oil
and gas sector has come to be associated with. A case in point is the
recent futile legislative probes into the administration of fuel subsidies
in the aftermath of the January 2012 nationwide protests over
government’s policy to increase the prices of petroleum products.61
The provisions of section 44(3) of the Constitution together with
section 1(1) of the Petroleum Actvest the ownership, management
and control of oil in all lands in the government of Nigeria, including
the territorial waters, continental shelf or Exclusive Economic Zones.
It effectively establishes the principle of eminent domain in Nigeria – a
principle defined by the Cato Institute as the constitutional power
‘enabling governments to take property from one owner, often small
and powerless, and transfer it to another, often large and politically
[stronger], all in the name of economic development’62 or improved
economic performance. Yet, there is an abysmally poor economic
performance to justify the continued implementation of the policy of
eminent domain in Nigeria. Economic development can be said to exist
only when the State seriously tackles and drastically reduces poverty,
60 Nigerian Constitution, s 44 (3).
61 The Nigerian government policy to increase the prices of locally consumed
petroleum products has been associated with the claim of subsidies on petroleum
products, which has become a greatly debated and highly controversial issue in
the polity.
62 Cato Institute, ‘Eminent Domain: Its Uses and Abuses’ (12 May 2002) <http:/
/www.cato.org/events/020514pf.html> accessed 28 July 2014.
63 Dudley Seers in II Ukpong, The Charms and Perils of the Nigerian Presidential
System: A Critical Review of Issues, Performance, and Trends (Vantage Press 1984)
83.
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unemployment, and inequality over time.63 It would appear that the
principle underlying the management and control of oil and gas is at
variance with the principle underpinning the management and control
of land in Nigeria, even though both are aimed at achieving the same
result or policy outcome. This is so because while the power of
management and control of land is vested in the governor of a state,64
the ownership, management and control of oil and mineral gas
underneath the land is vested in the federal government.65 This creates
an exception to the general common-law principle of quic quid plantatur
solo soloced it (whatever is affixed to the land belongs to the land).66
Accordingly, no state government, local government or any person or
group of persons, other than the federal government can exercise the
power of management and control over oil and gas in Nigeria, including
the seabed, the territorial waters or any area that forms parts of the
continental shelf or the Exclusive Economic Zone of Nigeria.67
Regarding the practice of federalism, it could be argued that vesting
in the federal government the legal ownership, and power of
management and control over all minerals and mineral oil in Nigeria
puts it in a dominant position in relation to the states. This situation
is further compounded as the exploration and production of minerals
and mineral oil are exclusively within the legislative powers of the
federal government.68 However, the power of management and control
of the revenues accruable from oil and gas appear to have been
circumscribed by the legal requirement placed upon the federal
government to share the revenues from oil with the states and local
governments, with a further requirement to transfer a portion (not
less than 13 per cent) to states where oil and gas resources are derived.69
64 Land Use Act, Cap L5 LFN 2004, ss 1, 2 (1) (a), & 5; see also K. U. Ekwere,
‘Sustainable Development of Oil and Gas in the Niger Delta: Legal and Political
Issues’ (PhD dissertation, the Law of the Sea and Maritime Law Institute,
University of Hamburg 2009) 23-9; Ebeku (n 23) 115-122.
65 Nigerian Constitution, s 44 and Petroleum Act, s 1.
66 Interpretation Act, Cap I23 LFN 2004, s 18, wherein land is defined to include
‘any building and any other thing attached to the earth or permanently fastened
to anything so attached, but does not include minerals’.
67 Ayoola-Daniels (n 50) 10.
68 Exclusive Legislative List of the 1999 Constitution, Second Schedule, item 39.
69 Nigerian Constitution, s 162 (1); see Allocation of Revenue (Federal Account,
etc) Act, Cap A15 LFN2004, s 1; see also Attorney General of the Federation v
Attorney General of Abia State & 35 Ors [2002] All NLR 72, 114 (Ogundare
JSC).
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This system of fiscal federalism is anchored on the philosophy of dual
economic systems within a system wherein citizens can expect to realize
their social and economic needs. Is this the case with the existing
revenue allocation system adopted in Nigeria?
4.  REVENUE ALLOCATION SYSTEM AND THE
MISMANAGEMENT OF NIGERIA’S OIL WEALTH
The Nigerian State is arguably preoccupied with the sharing of oil
revenues on the altar of national unity and mutual interdependence,
rather than the sustainable management of the oil wealth.70 This section
examines the political and historical background of Nigeria’s fiscal
practice. Although revenue allocation dates back to the establishment
of the Nigerian State, the rules or principles underlying the system of
revenue allocation in the country changed after the discovery of crude
oil in 1956. And the change in the underlying principles has impacted
on the sustainability of Nigeria’s oil wealth. For example, at the National
Conference of 2014, which was inaugurated by the Goodluck Jonathan
administration on 17 March 2014, issues pertaining to oil and the
management of oil revenues became so contentious that it was
impossible to reach a consensus on any point relating to oil.
Consequently, delegates unanimously agreed not to raise such
contentious issues in the final report.71 This explains why no mention
was made of oil in the final report, a document of 763 pages.
As the events in the Nigerian National Assembly, in respect of the
passage of the Petroleum Industry Bill have shown, it appears that
sectional interests would not allow the passage of some measures aimed
at institutionalizing sustainable management of oil resources in Nigeria.
Rather than apply federalism for the effective redistribution of wealth
and the realization of social and economic development, the federal
system in Nigeria has become a platform for the struggle for the control
of oil and the revenues that come from it. Therefore, it would appear
that the discovery of oil has not been helpful in promoting national
70 I. Ayu, ‘Reflections on Federalism and National Assembly Politics in Nigeria’, in
J.I. Elaigwu, P. C. Logams, H. S. Galadima (eds) Federalism and Nation Building
in Nigeria: The Challenges of the 21st Century (Monograph Series, National
Council on Intergovernmental Relations, 1994) 131.
71 Conversation with Akpandem James, assistant secretary on media and
communications to the National Conference 2014 (Uyo, 29 June 2015).
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cohesion, federalism and national development in Nigeria. The struggle
for the control of Nigeria’s oil and gas resources appears to be by ethnic
division, entwined with political conflicts which result in political
manipulation of  the people with the sole aim of determining resource
allocation.72 To drive home this point, it is important to briefly examine
the various revenue allocation epochs in Nigeria and the politics that
gave rise to them.
The Era of Devolution
Nigeria started off with the unitary system of government, and like
most other unitary States, intergovernmental relations determined the
revenue allocation system. The unitary system lasted between 1946
and 1953, when the Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council 1946
((Richards Constitution) and the Nigeria (Constitution) Order in
Council 1951 (Macpherson Constitution) were in operation. In 1946,
during the pendency of the Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council
1922 (Clifford Constitution), Sir Sydney Phillipson, Financial Secretary
of the Nigerian colony, made recommendations in a report, which later
formed the basis for intergovernmental fiscal relations under the 1946
Constitution. This revenue allocation system was later incorporated
into two subsequent constitutions. According to the Phillipson report:
The natural and … desirable development of the new constitution
will be towards progressive devolution, and the time may well
come when the regions will exercise, within their areas, powers
akin to those normally exercised by colonial governments, the
general government retaining direct authority in practice only
over services not transferred to the regions.73
The report, therefore, recommended the gradual evolution to a
revenue sharing system mainly based on the derivation principle. It
envisaged a situation where each regional government was to be
credited with the full amount of the tax collected under the Direct
Taxation Ordinance 1940 (as amended). Each region was, in addition,
72 C. U. Uche and O. C. Uche, ‘Oil and the Politics of Revenue Allocation in Nigeria’
(2004) (African Studies Centre, Working Paper 54/2004) 7 available at <http/
/www.ascleiden.nl/pdf/workingpaper54.pdf> accessed 17 November 2013.
73 Quoted in A. G. Adebayo, Embattled Federalism: History of Revenue Allocation in
Nigeria, 1946-1990 (Peter Lang Publishers 1993) 35.
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to receive grants from the other non-direct tax revenues and other
public funds of the colonial government in strict proportion to the
contribution that the region made to those other revenues.74  The report
further prescribed the horizontal table for the distribution of revenues
amongst the various regions as follows – Northern Region (46 per
cent), Western Region (30 per cent), and Eastern Region (24 per cent).
This system was based on the estimated relative contribution of the
various regions to the colonial government’s revenues not declared as
regional.75 The Philipson Committee Report laid the foundation for
the principle of derivation as a basis for the revenue allocation system
in Nigeria. It is important to note that during the subsistence of the
Richards Constitution, ‘customs duties alone contributed over 50 per
cent of the total revenue of the Nigerian government.’76
The constitutional changes occasioned by the arrival of a new
governor of Nigeria, Sir John Macpherson, resulted in the setting up of
another revenue allocation committee, whose report determined the
formulae for intergovernmental fiscal relations under the Nigerian
(Constitution) Order in Council 1951 (Macpherson Constitution). The
Hick-Phillipson committee report frowned at derivation as the sole
principle of revenue allocation and noted that:
The application of the single principle of derivation to the division
74 The preference of Sir Phillipson for the derivation principle was based on his
belief that there was need to inculcate in each region, a sense of ‘financial
responsibility’ so that they will all learn to ‘cut their coat according to their cloth’.
See Dina Committee Report (1967) 7.
75 The unreliability of data, from which the above figures were arrived at, became
a rallying point for critics of the Phillipson Report and indeed all subsequent
revenue allocation reports. It has, for instance, been noted that: [e]ach
Commission has been plagued with statistical problems. From Phillipson (1946)
to Adebayo (1977), problems of measurement have seemed insuperable and
have wrought havoc to each successive effort at devising a workable formula for
[revenue] allocation. In some cases, for example, Phillipson, they led to the
abandonment of particular principles; in others, for example, Adebayo, they
led to the abandonment of the recommendations. Data on regional consumption
of imports became the centre of controversy in the 1950s while data on
population took on an additional explosive political significance in the 1960s.
Only the data on rents and royalties and export duties were politically neutral;
but the allocation of revenue even from these sources crated political controversy’
(Okigbo Committee Report, vol. 1, 1978, 15-16).
76 Uche and Uche (n 73) 12.
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of the entire non-declared revenue represented an over-emphasis
of the principle of regional self-dependence and tended to obscure
the equally valid and perhaps more important principle of the
needs of the people viewed as citizens of a united Nigeria [as] the
unlimited application of the principle of derivation would be more
appropriate in a loose confederation of almost independent states
than in a federal constitution of the kind which Nigeria is about
to achieve.77
Despite the criticism of the principle of derivation as a basis of
revenue allocation system under the Richards Constitution, the Hick-
Phillipson committee report did not jettison the derivation principle.
It, however, retained it for the allocation of such taxes as could be
allocated with simplicity and certainty to the regions. The report
recommended that 50 per cent of revenue generated from ascertainable
taxes collected by the colonial government was to be allocated to
regions on the basis of derivation, while non-regional revenues, which
accounted for majority of the national budget was, however, to be
shared based on the principle of ‘need’ and ‘national interest’.78
Revenue Allocation and Decentralization
By 1953, there was a need to review the 1951 Macpherson Constitution.
This was mainly due to the constitutional developments at the time as
well as the growing support for federalism in the country. The need to
decentralize governmental powers and distribute the tasks of
governance ensured that Nigeria was to become a federal State
eventually. Consequently, the Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council
77 Government of Nigeria, Report of the Commission on Revenue Allocation (Lagos,
Government Printer 1951) 84 [hereinafter Hick-Phillipson Report].
78 The report also noted that in a unitary system, such as was practised in Nigeria
at the time, the appropriate principles of revenue allocation were, first, grant
from the central government to the regions in such a way as to encourage
expenditure on sectors of national importance such as education, with care not
to create unequal treatment and population and secondly, the use of population.
See ibid, 55. However, it thus seems that due to the unreliability of population
records at the time, as it is today, the report decided on the use of the number
of male adult taxpayers in the regions to estimate the revenue allocation based
on size of population. See C. Ashwe, Fiscal Federalism in Nigeria (Centre for
Research on Federal Financial Relations, Australian National University,
Canberra 1986) 29.
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1954 (Lyttleton Constitution) gave to the regions greater autonomy
to make laws for themselves on matters not specifically included in
the exclusive legislative list. The regions were also granted the power
to legislate on matters contained in the concurrent legislative list. This
constitutional power was shared with the federal government.
The constitutional changes brought about by the 1954 Lyttleton
Constitution meant that there was a need for a new revenue allocation
system for the country. The Chick Commission (chaired by Sir Louis
Chick) set up to undertake this task, recommended that less emphasis
be placed on ‘need’ and ‘national interest’ as determinants for the new
revenue allocation system.
In line with the mood of the country, the report indicated a strong
preference for fiscal autonomy and emphasized, yet again, the principle
of derivation as a basis for revenue sharing. Regrettably, the revenue
sharing system recommended by the Chick Commission did not last as
it was reviewed in 1958 – which coincided with the period when crude
oil was discovered in commercial quantity. For the first time in the
history of Nigeria’s revenue allocation system, the Raisman Committee
of 1958 recommended that the principle of derivation, which hitherto
ensured that 100 per cent of the revenues from mining rents and
royalties went to the regions be partially discontinued. It did not matter
that revenues from oil, at the time, was only 65,000 pounds – an
insufficient amount compared to what was earned from other mineral
resources. Yet the Raisman Committee noted that the allocation of the
proceeds of mining royalties has presented a most perplexing problem
because of the discovery of oil. Moreover, fearing that the oil-bearing
region may be credited with huge oil income revenues too sizeable to
ignore, and coupled with the need for stability and national
development, the Committee recommended the discontinuance of the
revenue allocation system, which was based on derivation.79
At independence, and consolidating on the provisions of the 1954
Lyttleton Constitution, section 134 of the Nigeria (Constitution) Order
in Council 1960 (the 1960 Constitution) also made provisions for
revenue allocation. That constitutional provision made specific reference
to minerals and mineral oil instead of natural resources. This appears
to be a measure that was adopted by the government to allow it focus
79 Colonial Office (Nigeria), Report of the Fiscal Commission (Her Majesty’s
Stationary Office, London 1958) 24 [Raisman Report].
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on the newly discovered crude oil as a more dependable source of
revenue for the national economy. The status quo remained the same
under the Constitution of the Federation 1963 (the 1963 Republican
Constitution), as the provisions relating to revenue allocation remained
unchanged.80 However, in a rather dramatic fashion, the Dina Committee
on revenue allocation, set up by the General Yakubu Gowon military
administration in 1968, recommended the complete discontinuance
of the principle of derivation, hinging the reason on the need to promote
national integration and development. The report noted that:
‘[o]nce it is accepted that the overwhelming social urge is for
accelerated economic development as a major prerequisite for
expansion of welfare services, then the point must be sustained
that financial relations become only meaningful in the context of
integrated development planning.’81
In any case, the above statement does not make any sense in a
federal system rather it merely served the end of a unitary system,
which the military government at the time needed to quell the Biafra
secessionist movement. Besides, this recommendation contradicted
the ideology held by Obafemi Awolowo, the then federal finance
commissioner. As Awolowo once noted, ‘[i]t is dishonest to the extreme
for a relatively poorer state to expect to have a share from the revenue
derived from a relatively richer state.’82 Nevertheless, in April 1969 the
federal government went on to implement the committee’s report, even
though state commissioners of finance on behalf of the affected oil
bearing states rejected its recommendations. The result was the
80 See Constitution of the Federation No. 20 of 1963, s 140; see also Attorney
General of the Federation v Attorney General of Abia State (n 66) 99 (Ogundare
JSC).
81 Dina Committee Report (1969) 29. The report also stated: ‘[w]e believe that
the fiscal arrangements in this country should reflect the new found spirit of
unity to which the nation is dedicated. No more evidence of this is necessary
than the present war to preserve this unity at the cost of human lives, material
resources and the radical change in this country’s structure. It is in the spirit of
this new-found unity that we have viewed all the sources of revenue of this
country as the common funds of the country to be used for executing the kind
of programmes which can maintain this unity’ (ibid, 27).
82 Obafemi Awolowo, quoted in O. Obinna, Public Finance (Pacific College Press
Limited 1985) 113.
83 Decree No. 51 of 1969.
84 Decree No. 9 of 1971.
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promulgation of the Petroleum Decree 196983 and the Offshore Oil
Revenue Decree 1971.84 It was the later decree that introduced the
dichotomy between onshore and offshore oil in the determination of
revenue from crude oil and allocated to the federal government the
revenues derived from off-shore oil.85 Not only has the availability of
oil resulted in the distortion of the revenue allocation system in Nigeria,
it has also become highly political as ‘[t]he struggle for the control of
the oil wealth has led to an unfortunate shift [in focus] from a revenue-
oriented principle to an expenditure-oriented principle of revenue
allocation’.86 This loss of focus has resulted in the impoverishment of
the citizens more than they were before oil was discovered.87 Despite
this gloomy situation, successive governments have continued to
promote wasteful policies at the expense of the citizens. Two of such
ubiquitous policies in the Nigerian polity are examined in the following
section.
5.  THE HIGH COST OF GOVERNANCE
This article will not attempt an exhaustive examination of the causes
of the high cost of governance in Nigeria as there are quite a number of
factors. For example, the bloated salaries paid to elected and appointed
public office holders constitute one of such aspects. In this section,
only two issues – the growth and expansion in governmental structures
and the policy of security votes – which promote this trend are
examined.
The Growth and Expansion in Governmental
Structures88
The cost of governance in Nigeria has, since the 1970s, expanded
geometrically whereas the economy has struggled to catch up. This is
partly due to the unnecessary expansion in governmental structures,
85 Petroleum Act, s 1.
86 Uche and Uche (n 73) 41.
87 J. Herbst, ‘Is Nigeria a Viable State?’ (1996) 19 (2) The Washington Quarterly
151, 159.
88 Ukpong (n 64) ch 4.
89 Rationalization of Federal Government Parastatals and Agencies Committee
Report (2012) [Oronsanye Report].
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agencies, and institutions with overlapping functions.89 Consequently,
the cost to keep the governing process going at all levels has become
unsustainable. Yet while a constitutional amendment was underway
in the National Assembly in 2014/2015, there were proposals for wives
of the president and state governors to be officially recognized under
the Constitution, by creating the office of the first lady at the federal
and state levels. It would appear that this is a measure to accord
constitutional recognition to the hitherto unconstitutional and illegal
funding of the activities promoted by the spouses of the president and
state governors in Nigeria. Interestingly, there were also proposals from
sections of the country for more states to be created out of the existing
ones. As things stand today, this appears to be mere wishful thinking
as the 2014 National Conference in its resolution urged that, ‘without
prejudice to states constituting the federating units, states that wish
to merge may do so in accordance with the Constitution’.90
Political enterprises such as the ones highlighted here contribute
in diverting resources away from investments in public goods and
services to the expansion of State bureaucracy. In recent times, the
debate on the economic non-viability of many states in Nigeria has
been in the front burner of national discourse.91 According to Sanusi
90 The National Conference 2014, Main Report (Abuja, August 2014) 197.
91 With the inability of many state governments to pay workers’ salaries and
satisfy other social obligations for several months, they have had to go to the
federal government for bailout funds. E. Archibong, ‘Bailout: CBN Restructures
States’ Loan Repayment to 20 Years’ Business Day (Lagos, 24 July 2015) <http:/
/businessdayonline.com/2015/07/bailout-cbn-retructures-states-loan-
repayment-to-20-years/> accessed 7 August 2015; ‘Governors Meet
Wednesday, Seek Bailout to Pay Salaries’ This Day (Lagos, 17 June 2015)
<www.thisdaylive.com/articles/governors-meet-wednesday-seek-bailout-to-
pay-salaries/212244/> accessed 7 August 2015.
92 For example, the 2011 revenue profile of Akwa Ibom, an oil producing state,
shows that recurrent revenue was NGN 174.527 billion (12.534 billion from
internal sources; 24.714 billion from statutory allocation; 6.452 billion from
value added tax (VAT) and 129.060 billion from derivation), while capital
receipt was NGN 24.851 billion. See G. O. Akpabio, ‘Budget of Industrialization:
Text of 2012 Budget Presentation to Akwa Ibom State House of Assembly’
Finance News (Ministry of Finance, January 2012) 41. It is obvious from the
foregoing that statutory allocation and derivation funds are major sources of
revenue for the state. Comparing this with other states besides Lagos, Kano and
other oil producing states, it is obvious that more than two thirds of the states
in Nigeria are economically non-viable. See for example, the comments by V. I.
Masi, minister of finance in the second republic, quoted in Ukpong (n 64) 99.
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Lamido Sanusi, a former governor of the CBN, most states and indeed
many local governments in Nigeria are not economically viable,92 as a
significant amount of their revenues are spent on running the machinery
of government while millions of the population are left at the mercy of
unemployment and poverty.93 Sanusi’s comment is a validation of Ross’s
assertion that governments are affected by the kind of revenues they
collect.94 For as soon as the Nigerian State began to witness sharp
changes in its revenues as a result of the perennial increase in oil prices,
government spending began to grow faster than the economy.95
Arguably, this has become a frequent trend in Nigeria, with
consequent constraints on the capacity of the Nigerian State to meet
its obligation of progressive realization of the social and economic
aspirations of the citizens who look up to the State for social
protection.96 This points to a murky situation, which, for Jeffrey Herbst,
is a consequence of a particular pattern of Nigeria’s politics that
threatens even to impoverish the population and to cause a catastrophic
collapse of the social and economic structures of the country.97
Consequently, Herbst urged the international community to
acknowledge that ‘Nigeria does not work and probably cannot work’,98
and to set in motion a rescue mission for the sake of millions of Nigerians
and the African continent.
One thing is certain, a State that fails to see the social needs of its
citizens as its ultimate priority will never be efficient, and a State that
is not efficient is a failed State. Notwithstanding the obvious failure of
93 According to Sanusi, ‘[d]o we need 36 states [in Nigeria]? Do we need the
number of ministries that we have? Is an economy where states spend 96 per
cent of their revenue[s] paying civil servants an economy that is likely to grow
in the long run? … We have created states and local governments and ministries
as structures that are economically unviable and the result is that we do not
have funding for [social] infrastructure, we do not have funding for education;
we do not have funding for health. I do not know how many people know that
70 per cent of the revenue of the federal government is spent paying salaries
and overhead; leaving the rest of 30 per cent for 150 million Nigerians.’  S. L.
Sanusi, ‘Re-invigorating Education in Nigeria’ Daily Times (Lagos, 31 October
2011) <http://dailytimes.com.ng/article/most-our-states-are-not-viable>
accessed 28 November 2014.
94 See Ross (n 20) 27.
95 ibid 27-29.
96 Solomon (n 54) 101, 103.
97 Herbst (n 88) 151.
98 ibid.
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the Nigerian State, successive governments allude to economic growth
and development as if they occur in a vacuum. Writing on development,
Dudley Seers noted that if the social and economic problems of poverty,
unemployment, and inequality have declined over time, ‘then beyond
a doubt this has been a period of development for the country
concerned. [Otherwise], it would be strange to attribute such condition
as development irrespective of growth in GDP.’99
The point being made here is that economic development is people-
centred rather than economic growth. This prescription especially holds
for a developing country such as Nigeria, where poverty, unemployment,
income inequality, high rates of illiteracy and mortality100 are serious
social problems that ‘may well serve as indices of good or effective
government’.101
The question may then be asked: On what should government direct
it’s spending? According to Michael Ross, oil-rich countries spend oil
revenues in two ways. Those with authoritarian regimes spend oil
revenues in buying public support to enable those regimes to remain
in power as long as they may wish. Therefore, as he noted, ‘[c]ountries
with great per capita oil wealth, like the kingdoms of the Arabian
Peninsula provide their citizens with a remarkable portfolio of free
benefits, such as education through college, free health care, and
subsidized food and housing.’102 In the alternative, he argued that the
oil revenues are simply lost to State theft. This holds true for Nigeria,
as ‘wealth is substantially gained through military might or strategic
political position’ which necessitates the struggle for State power that
can promote resource capture – a benefit only State power confers.103
Ross qualified the developmental capacity of oil-rich States by
99 Seers quoted in Ukpong (n 64).
100 For the updated data on infant mortality rate in Nigeria as at 2015, see Central
Intelligence Agency, ‘Infant Mortality Rate’ in The World Factbook
<www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2091.html>
accessed 19 December 2015); Central Intelligence Agency, ‘Life Expectancy at
Birth’ in The World Factbook <www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2012rank.html> accessed 19 December 2015.
101 Ukpong (n 64) 83.
102 Ross (n 20) 78.
103 E. Nnadozie, ‘Are Growth and Development Constitutional Issues in Nigeria?’
(paper presented at the CSAE sixth annual conference, Understanding Poverty
and Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, St Catherine’s College, Oxford, 18 & 19
March 2002) 6.
2016 SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT OF NIGERIA’S OIL WEALTH 159
suggesting that the size of the population of an oil-rich country may
have some role to play in the efficient application of oil revenues.
Going by this argument, it is safe to say that Nigeria is a country with
very low per capita income despite its huge oil endowment because of
its fast growing population in contrast to the tiny population of the
oil-rich Arabian nations. This suggests that Nigeria may, after all, not
be a rich country. If this is the case, and the facts are available to policy
makers, why have they failed to promote policies that would stimulate
the other sectors of the economy?
The foregoing argument notwithstanding, the challenges posed to
the sustainable management of oil wealth in Nigeria have been greatly
attributed to the social maladies of corruption (a crime with victims,
citizens, who are unable to realize their full potentials) and waste in
the governing process. For example, when the military first entered
governance in 1966, it accused the politicians of the First Republic of
political corruption. The allegation of graft and misuse of public funds
was also levelled against the military administration of General Gowon
when it was overthrown in a bloodless coup in 1975.104
The story has remained the same since the return to civilian rule in
1999, with each successive administration accusing the preceding one
of waste, mismanagement and State theft.105 It is on record that only
the administration of former President Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2007)
refrained from levelling accusations of waste, misuse of public funds
and corruption against the administration immediately preceding it,
even though revelations in the public domain reveal otherwise. The
presidential system was first practised in Nigeria between 1979 and
1983. The huge financial resources deployed in running the system
did not match the social and economic realities of the country at the
time and ‘[a]t the end of the first four years, the presidential system
and the realities of the Nigerian society seem to have functioned on
two mutually exclusive planes of affluence and poverty.’106 Examining
the flamboyance of the presidential democracy of 1979 to 1983 in
relation to the level of economic performance, Ukpong identified that
104 M. Mohammed, ‘A Time for Action’ (A Broadcast Speech to the Nation, 30 July
1975) 8, 15.
105 P. Smith, ‘Honeymoon Over’ The Africa Report (Paris, July-August 2016) 50,
51; O. Egbo et al, ‘Security Votes in Nigeria: Disguising Stealing from the Public
Purse’ (2012) 111 (445) African Affairs, 607.
106 Ukpong (n 64) 133.
107 ibid 134.
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there was a linkage between oil wealth, politics and the legal regime,
which established the Presidential System.107
The Policy of Security Votes
Various definitions have been proffered on the meaning of security
votes. While some see security votes as the unconstitutional
appropriation by all tiers of government in Nigeria for the purpose of
ensuring national security,108 others have described it as a conduit for
graft under the guise of enhancing national security.109 Research has
shown that some of the definitions may not stand the test of law.
Therefore, the policy of security votes, as practised in Nigeria, may be
defined as an omnibus expenditure heading under which public funds
are appropriated, through budgetary and extra-budgetary measures,
by all levels of government in Nigeria for the purpose of enhancing
state security.
Since the return to civilian rule in 1999 (the Fourth Republic),
security votes have remained a recurrent discourse in Nigeria. Each
year, huge public funds are secured at all levels of government in Nigeria
in the name of security votes.110 These funds are purportedly
appropriated for State security. In spite of these huge expenditures on
security, social vices such as kidnappings, cultism, assassinations,
robbery and others are rife all across the country. The question may
then be asked: Whose interest is served with the allocation and
appropriation of security votes – the citizens or public office holders
who are directly entrusted with the funds? At the federal level, funds
108 C. Kumolu, ‘Insecurity: What has the Security Vote Secured? Vanguard (Lagos,
15 May 2013) <www.vanguardngr.com/2013/05/insecurity-what-has-the-
security-votes-secured/> accessed 2 November 2014.
109 O. Egbo et al, ‘Institutionalizing Corruption: Security Votes in Nigeria’ (African
Studies Centre, Leiden, The Netherland, ASC Working Paper 91/2010) 4,
available at <https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/
16186/ASC-075287668-278801.pdf?sequence=2> accessed 30 October
2014.
110 O. Egbo et al, ‘Security Votes in Nigeria: Disguising Stealing from the Public
Purse’ (n 103)597-614, for the history and practice of security votes, as well
as the ambiguity, secrecy and unaccountability associated with it at all levels of
government in Nigeria.
111 The sums of N264 billion, N348 billion, N921.91 billion, N1.05 trillion and
N968.13 billion were approved by the National Assembly in the Appropriation
Acts of 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014 respectively for security.
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are allocated each year to the ministry of defence and other security
agencies in the appropriation law,111 ‘as national security is the exclusive
responsibility of the federal government’.112 Yet state governors and
local government chairmen appropriate massive funds each year under
the security vote expenditure head.
While a few state governments include security vote expenditures
in their annual appropriation laws,113 the majority of the states do not
disclose how much funds are allocated and expended as security votes.
There is no accountability, in whatever form, to the public. Therefore,
it has been argued that security votes are channels that allow some
elected public officers to misappropriate and, in most cases, steal public
funds outright.
In a dramatic fashion, Musa Rabiu Kwankwaso, a former governor
of Kano State and Rochas Okorocha, the incumbent governor of Imo
State, aroused public interest in security vote expenditures with their
unprecedented declarations on these funds shortly after they took the
oath of office in 2011. Governor Kwakwanso, who was first elected to
office from 1999-2003, described security votes as another way of
stealing public funds and vowed not to have anything to do with it.
Governor Okorocha, on the other hand, slashed his state’s annual
security votes from N6.5 billion to N2.5 billion and noted that he was
freeing the gains made in the cut for education and other social
programmes that are in dire need of funding. The amount appropriated
as security votes by state governments in Nigeria range between N400
million and N2 billion on a monthly basis. Over N1.5 trillion is
allocated and expended annually as security votes by governments at
all levels in Nigeria, virtually all of which is lost to corruption.114
Some legal and social commentators have argued that security votes
are illegal and unconstitutional and that the practice is the height of
irresponsibility on the part of all governments in the Federation. This
112 O. Egbo et al, (n 106) 608.
113 Section 1 of the Lagos State Security Trust Fund Law 2007, established a trust
fund in Lagos state for ‘response to the operational deficiency of the Police and
other federal security agencies within the state due to long years of neglect by
the federal government, particularly in the areas of funding and provision of
modern equipment.’ See Lagos State Security Trust Fund, available at
<www.lagosstatesecuritytrustfund.org/profile> accessed 28 September 2015.
114 Chicago Tribune, available at <my.chicagotribune.com/#section/-1/article/
p2p-85074850/> accessed 22 November 2015.
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argument is anchored on the fact that section 14(2)(b) of the Nigerian
Constitution, or any other section of the Constitution for that matter,
does not provide that security votes should be allocated to elected
public officers to appropriate as they see fit. On the other hand, there
is the argument that ‘[t]he most general purpose of [S]tate power is
to provide security for citizens and other residents and to enable them
lead a life that is meaningful to them’.115 The second argument finds
support in the Nigerian Constitution to the extent that ‘the security
and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government’.116
It is this normative and constitutional requirement that reinforces the
argument that there exist both legal and constitutional bases for the
policy of security votes in Nigeria.
The apprehension generated by the policy of security votes in
Nigeria, in recent times, are not misplaced as it is the vulnerable in
society who are most affected by anti-social policies. In recognition of
this, Nkereuwem Akpan, an Abuja-based legal practitioner and human
rights activist, commenced a lawsuit at the Federal High Court, Abuja,
in 2010. In the suit, he sought a declaratory order against the 36 state
governors and the Minister of the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) in
relation to the legality and constitutionality of security votes drawn
from the public treasury of the states and the FCT, respectively.117 In his
statement of claim, the plaintiff asserted that no law in Nigeria,
including the Constitution, recognizes the policy of security votes. The
plaintiff, therefore, urged the court to declare the action of the
115 P. Y. Ghai and J. Ghai, MDGs through Socio-economic Rights: Constitution Making
and Implementation Handbook (Excerpt) (United Nations Millennium Campaign,
Bangkok 2009) 20.
116 Nigerian Constitution, s 14(2)(b).
117 Nkereuwem Udofia Akpan v Executive Governor of Abia State & 38 Ors (Suit
No.FHC/ABJ/CS/753/2010) [Unreported]. In its judgment, the Court held
that the plaintiff could only bring the suit against the state governments in
their respective states. This would be almost impossible to do as he would be
required to bring 36 lawsuits across the country. Besides, the plaintiff, or
anyone for that matter, could not do so because there is no equivalent of the
Fiscal Responsibility Act in most of the states.
118 The 3rd defendant raised a preliminary objection that the plaintiff lacked the
locus standi to institute the suit. However, by the provision of sections 36(1),
40, 41 42 and 48 of the Fiscal Responsibility Act Cap F40LFN 2004, it appears
that the plaintiff has standing to institute the suit, but, it should be noted that
the provisions of the Act as depicted in the long title and explanatory
memorandum to the Act does not apply to the states that have not passed the
Fiscal Responsibility Law in their states. And a great number of them have not.
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defendants as illegal and unconstitutional.118
In the statement of defence filed by the Akwa Ibom State Ministry
of Justice for the third defendant (governor of Akwa Ibom State), it
was contended, among other things, that the security votes collected
by the governor, deputy governor and speaker of the state House of
Assembly are legal and constitutional as they have legislative backing
by way of appropriation laws,119 which were legally passed by the Akwa
Ibom State House of Assembly pursuant to sections 100 and 120(2)
of the 1999 Constitution. These provisions in the Nigerian Constitution
confer on state legislatures the power to make laws for the states.
The combined effect of sections 59 and 100 of the Nigerian
Constitution, section 56 of the Fiscal Responsibility Act and section
18 of the Interpretation Act make it clear that security votes, when
legally budgeted and appropriated becomes a lawful expenditure. For
when the Legislature approves a money bill and it receives the assent
of the president or governor, as the case may be, it becomes law. It is,
therefore, submitted that although the Nigerian Constitution does not
expressly provide for security votes, it could be inferred from the
provisions of section 14(2)(b) of the Constitution that security votes
constitute permissible expenditures.120
The policy of security votes appears to have legal and constitutional
backing beyond the permissibility argument. Also problematic is the
misapplication of the provision of section 14(2)(b) of the Constitution,
as it is the security of the citizens that is intended and not the security
of select individuals in public office as the practice in Nigeria suggests.
Perhaps, as one writer has suggested, the justification for this practice
may well be that governments in Nigeria wish to rearrange Maslow’s
hierarchy of needs by realizing the needs of citizens starting with
security rather than basic needs such as ensuring food security, drinkable
water, decent housing, healthcare, quality education and employment
opportunities.121
Besides, the legal and constitutional issues, which have been raised
119 Interpretation Act Cap I23 LFN 2004, s 18 and Fiscal Responsibility Act, s 56,
for the meaning of Appropriation Law.
120 The principle for the permissibility argument under the Nigerian Constitution
is briefly discussed in Solomon (n 54) 113-114.
121 A. Ogbodo, ‘Security Votes as Governors ‘Awoof’ Money’ The Guardian (Lagos, 1
July 2012) available at <www.ngrguardiannews.com/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=90887:security-votes-as-governors-awoof-
money&catid=104:sunday-magazine&Itemid=567> accessed 29 July 2012.
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in respect of the policy of security votes, other fundamental issues
such as the appropriate authority that should be responsible for the
expenditure of the funds and how they should be expended remain
unresolved. For example, in the US from where the practice may have
derived, security votes are predicated on covert diplomatic intelligence
activities. Each year, the appropriation committees of the US Congress
appropriate funds for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The CIA
is an independent agency responsible for providing national security
intelligence to senior US policymakers.122 The funds allocated to the
CIA are specifically devoted to espionage and other covert operations.
Owing to the surreptitious nature of its assignments, it is not expected
to, and does not, publicly account for its budgetary votes. The CIA
budget is secret, and the agency is allowed to keep its staffing,
organizational structure, salaries and number of its employees secret.123
It only briefs the select committees of the US Congress (the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence) whose members are sworn to secrecy.
According to The World Factbook, ‘[i]n 1997, the total budget for all
US government intelligence and intelligence-related activities – of which
the CIA is a part – was [US$] 26.6 billion. [However] the intelligence
budgets for all other years remain classified.’124 For many years, during
and after the Cold War, the agency’s primary mission was to protect
the US against communism and the Soviet Union. Notably, these days,
the agency has an even more complex job, which is to protect the US
from terrorist threats all over the world.125
In contrast, Nigeria’s mutated security vote policy and practice
entrusts the discretionary powers to spend huge public funds on certain
elected public officials who may not have any idea of operational issues
on security matters. In the country, security votes are allocated to the
president, heads of the two chambers of the National Assembly, state
122 Central Intelligence Agency, ‘Today’s CIA’ The World Factbook<www.cia.gov/
about-cia/todays-cia/index.html> accessed 30 June 2012.
123 Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, Pub L 110, 63 Stat 208 (50 USC
403a etseq) s 6.
124 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook<www.cia.gov/about-cia/faqs/
index.html#whoworks> accessed 30 June 2012 (emphasis added).
125 C. Wilbert, ‘How the CIA Works’ <https://people.howstuffworks.com/cia.htm>
accessed 30 June 2012.
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governors, speakers of state Houses of Assembly and chairpersons of
local government councils.126 In some cases, with the discretion of the
president and state governors, the vice-president, the secretary to the
government of the federation (SGF), deputy governors and secretaries
to state governments also benefit from the security vote policy. These
funds are spent entirely at the discretion of the holder of the office.
This policy and practice, which unnecessarily increases the cost of
democratic governance in Nigeria, has become endemic and promotes
state theft through the secrecy in which the budgeting, allocation and
appropriation of the funds are shrouded.127
It is obvious from the scanty data on security vote allocations that
many state governments do not include security vote expenditures in
their appropriation laws, as they prefer to apply extra-budgetary
measures in the allocation of such funds.128 This ensures that the public
is kept out of the loop on this bogus expenditure. An example of
governments’ secrecy policy on security votes was demonstrated by
the responses of the accountants general of Kwara and Delta states to
an application made by the Legal Defence and Assistance Project
(LEDAP), a CSO, requesting for information from all the 36 states of
the Federation in respect of security vote expenditures, pursuant to
section 1 of the Freedom of Information Act 2011.129 In response to
the application, the accountants general of the two states stated that
the information sought by LEDAP were exempted by the Act and
therefore noted that they were not at liberty to provide the information
126 Human Rights Watch, ‘Chop Fine: The Human Rights Impact of Local
Government Corruption and Mismanagement in Rivers State, Nigeria’, (2007)
19(2a) Human Rights Watch 32-3, for an analysis of how local government
authorities in Nigeria deprive the people of social amenities.
127 For an analysis of the linkage between security votes and corruption in Nigeria,
see O Egbo, ‘Legitimizing Corruption in Government: Security Votes in Nigeria’
(2010) African Studies Centre Working Paper 91/2010 available at <https:/
/openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/16186/ASC-075287668-
2788-01.pdf?sequence=2> accessed 29 September 2013.
128 Punch on the Web, ‘Governors Hide Security Votes’ <www.punchng.com/
Articl,aspx?theartic=Art201107164312492> accessed 2 September 2013;
Business Day, ‘Security Votes for Who?’ <www.businessdayonline.com/NG/
index.php/editorial/24034-security-vote-for-who> accessed 9 September
2013; The Will, ‘State Governors and their Security Votes’ <http://
thewillnigeria.com/opinion/6671-STATE-GOVERNORS-AND-THEIR-
SECURITY-VOTES.html> accessed10 June 2013.
129 Freedom of Information Act Cap F43 LFN 2004.
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to LEDAP.
On the other hand, the accountants general of the remaining 34
states refused out-right to respond to the application. Consequently,
LEDAP commenced an action at the Federal High Court, Lagos, on 6
July 2011, for an order of mandamus to compel the accountants general
of the 36 states of the Federation to furnish it with information on the
security votes allocated and released to the governors, deputy governors
and speakers of the state Houses of Assembly.
The Freedom of Information Act provides that the court can order
an institution to which a request for information was made, but refused
or failed to provide the information within the period prescribed by
the Act, to release such information.130 It should be noted that the
information requested by LEDAP is not exempted under the Act as
claimed by the accountants general of Kwara and Delta States. Indeed
it is not a course or research material prepared by faculty members of
educational institutions, published material or material available for
purchase by the public, library or museum material made or acquired
and preserved for public reference or exhibition, or material placed in
the National Archives.131 The official secrecy of the policy at all levels of
government in Nigeria only validates the damning conclusion reached
by a study that ‘[t]he greater the oil wealth is, the more secretive the
budget. The secrecy of … oil producers is especially pronounced [in]
opaque governments – Angola, Chad, Nigeria, and Cameroon ... [And]
the five most transparent in Africa–South Africa, Botswana, Zambia,
Uganda, and Namibia – have little or no petroleum.’132
6.  FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The purpose of this section is to examine the future directions for the
management of Nigeria’s oil wealth. The future direction requires a
two-level approach consisting of legal and extra-legal measures – each
of which may have an impact on the other. In a bid to effectively play
the role of a developmental state, Nigeria has deployed some legal
measures in the regulation of the oil and gas sector in the past. The
130 ibid, ss 20 and 25.
131 ibid, ss 17 and 26.
132 Ross (n 20) 81 (emphasis added).
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first of such measures involved taking greater control of the Nigerian
oil and gas industry.133 This measure sought to directly increase and
enhance the State’s interests in the oil and gas sector. It is also aimed
at ensuring that a greater share of revenues from oil exploration and
for improved provision of public goods and services.
Observably, there are consistent claims that the national oil
company fails or refuses to transfer tens of billions of dollars in oil
revenues to the national treasury each year. In most cases the
whereabouts of these funds are never properly accounted for.134 Many
commentators have argued that the NNPC is the single most corrupt
organization in Nigeria as it has, over the years, become too complex
for its activities to be properly monitored.135 Arguably, this has
implications for the funding of the upstream sector as the government
which is often faced with the challenge of meeting its Joint Venture
funding obligations.136 This situation has led to the increased utilization
of measures such as the Petroleum Sharing Contract (PSC) and Modified
Carried Agreement (MCA), which, to a large extent, have contributed
to undermining the State’s interest in the oil and gas sector.137 The
complex nature of the NNPC in respect of its various activities in the
oil and gas sector has made it difficult for the Nigerian Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI) to deliver on its mandate to
improve transparency and accountability in the management of
revenues from Nigeria’s extractive resources.138 The mandate of the
NEITI is to ensure that companies operating in the extractive industry
133 KPMG Professional Services, ‘Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Brief’ (KPMG
Nigeria June 2014) 10 <www.kpmg.com/NG/en/IssuesAndInsights/
ArticlesPublications/Documents/Nigerian%20oil%20and%20gas%20Industry
%20brief.pdf>accessed 21 August 2016.
134 B. Udo, ‘Missing $20 bn: Sanusi Faults Alison-Madueke, Says Audit Report
Proves at Least $18.5 bn Lost’ Premium Times (Abuja, 14 May 2015)
<www.premiumtimesng.com/news/182926-missing-20-bn-sanusi-faults-
alison-madueke-says-audit-report-proves-at-least-18-5bn-lost.html>accessed
2 August 2016; O. Nnodim, ‘We Owe Federation Account N326 bn, Not N3.23
trn – NNPC’ Punch (17 March 2016).
135 I. Izeze, ‘NEITI’s Recant on NNPC’s Unremitted $22.8 Billion: Shame of a
Corrupt Nation’ Point Blank News (26 March 2014) <pointblanknews.com/
pbn/articles-opinions/neitis-recant-onnnpcs-unremitted-22-8-billion-shame-
of-a-corrupt-nation/> accessed 20 July 2016.
136 KPMG Professional Services (n 134) 19.
137 Sharife, ‘How Nigeria’s Lucrative Oil Profits Disappear’ (n 34).
138 NEITI Act, s 2.
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follow due process in the payments of revenues into the public treasury.
Therefore, there is a need for the urgent unbundling of the NNPC and
its subsidiaries into smaller and manageable corporations139 devoid of
overlapping functions in the oil and gas industry, and with legislative
control over their activities.
There is also the application of the legal approach to enhance local
participation in the oil and gas sector through the local content
requirement which is aimed at increasing the ‘level of Nigerian Content
in the country’s oil and gas industry’,140 by ‘demanding that a certain
percentage of intermediate goods used in the [oil] production processes
[are] sourced from domestic manufacturers.’141 In line with this policy,
the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act (NOGIC
Act) defines Nigerian Content as
the quantum of composite value added to or created in the Nigerian
economy by a systematic development of capacity and capabilities
through the deliberate utilization of Nigerian human material
resources and service in the Nigerian oil and gas industry.142
The NOGIC Act makes provisions for the first consideration of
Nigerian independent operators, goods, and services as well as to
Nigerians in employment and training.143 The law also covers all
fabrications and welding activities in the oil and gas industry, which
must be done in the Nigeria.144 Observably, the efficacy of this strategy
is yet to be felt on employment opportunities, as the Nigerian oil and
gas industry created only 582 jobs of the 10.97 million new jobs in
139 O. Nnodim and F. Asu, ‘FG to Spilt NNPC into 30 Firms Next Week’ Punch
(Lagos, 4 March 2014) <punchng.com/fg-to-split-nnpc-into-30-firms-next-
week/> accessed 15 June 2016.
140 Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act No. 2 of 2010; KPMG
Professional Services (n 134) 17.
141 S. M. Stephenson, ‘Addressing Local Content Requirements: Current Challenges
and Future Opportunities’ (2013) 7(3) BIORES<www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/
biores/news/addressing-local-content-reguirements-current-challenges-and-
future-opportunities> accessed 21 August 2016.
142 NOGIC Act, s 3.
143 ibid ss 10, 12, 15, 28 and 35.
144 ibid s 41.
145 M. Eboh, ‘Unemployment: Oil Sector Employs 0.01% of Nigerian Workforce’
Vanguard (Lagos, 3 June 2014)<www.vanguardngr.com/2014/06/
unemployment-oil-sector-employs-0.0i-nigerian-workforce/> accessed 20
August 2016.
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2013145 and out of a total of 41,672 new jobs generated in the third
quarter of 2015, the oil sector recorded zero.146 Low crude oil prices
have worsened the situation as the sector has recorded huge job losses
since 2015.
Thirdly, evidence on the ground shows an acute shortage of
infrastructure-focused investments – with the capacity to boost other
sectors of the economy – in the oil and gas industry.147 Infrastructural
focused investment is a measure of the potential for sectoral and
developmental linkages between oil and gas revenues and research
and development, as well as other socio-economic indicators. If properly
implemented this third measure has the potential to increase real
benefits from oil resource by trickling down the gains of oil wealth
regarding improving the social and economic condition of citizens.
Fourthly, and also very central to the sustainable management of
Nigeria’s oil wealth are issues relating to good governance. For some
scholars and commentators, regarding the sustainable management of
resource-based wealth, transparency, and accountability (or the lack of
these) in governance have been identified as very critical issues, which
add to resource-driven development processes. These issues can be
located at the core of the resource curse thesis.148
This article has so far demonstrated that this argument comes into
sight for Nigeria. Therefore, the vigilance of the citizens and CSOs is
required to keep State institutions and companies in the extractive
industry in check. It is recommended that NEITI should be empowered,
through legislative amendment, to transmit from being a mere watch
dog of the oil and gas industry to an institution with prosecutory
authority to protect the public interest in the management of extractive
resources in Nigeria.
146 National Bureau of Statistics, Employment (Job) Creation Survey, 3rd Quarter
2015 (November 2015) <www.nigeriastat.gov.ng/pdfuploads/Job_Creation_
Q3_2015.pdf> accessed 19 August 2016.
147 H. Besada and P. Martin, ‘Mining Codes in Africa: Emergence of a ‘Fourth’
Generation?’ (2015) 28(2) Cambridge Review of International Affairs263,
276; KPMG Professional Services (n 134)19.
148 Ross, The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations
(n 20) ch 2; R Auty, Sustainable Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource
Curse Thesis (Routledge 1993).
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7.  CONCLUSION
The permissive role of weak state institutions, lack of transparency
and accountability in governance, and the absence of detailed legal
framework on sustainable resource management have created the right
atmosphere for the continued unsustainable management of oil wealth
in Nigeria. Furthermore, the proliferation of unproductive and resource-
sinking administrative units, governmental corruption and
misappropriation of funds, and the failure to create a linkage between
oil revenues and high economic performance have combined to make
the Nigerian State nothing more than an oil selling enterprise.149 This
reality calls for urgent and radical reform of extant resource laws and
institutions in Nigeria to mainstream and reinforce sustainable oil
wealth management.
There is also an important role for the Nigerian public in acting as
active gatekeepers for accountability and transparency in Nigeria’s oil
sector. Citizens cannot continue to remain complacent in the hope
that the State and its institutions will function in their interest, even
as the courts continue to hold onto legalistic and formalistic procedures.
The Nigerian public must, therefore, realize that social change in Nigeria
can be guaranteed by their resolve to aspire and demand policies and
laws which are capable of engendering high economic performance in
Nigeria. To this end, CSOs and the media can do more to provide the
momentum that is required for social change in Nigeria. This includes
providing citizens with adequate and reliable information on how
policies and laws that may be put in place for the management of oil
revenues affect their lives.150
149 J. Alabi, ‘Special Report: Unbundling the ‘Missing’ $20bn Oil Fund Mystery’
Energy News (Lagos, 26 February 2015)<energynews-ng.com/special-report-
unbundling-the-missing-20bn-oil-fund-mystery/> accessed 21 November
2015.
150 J. Hatchard, Combating Corruption: Legal Approaches to Supporting Good
Governance andIntegrity in Africa (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2014) 75;
see also Damilola Olawuyi, Principles of Nigerian Environmental Law (Afe
Babalola University Press 2015) 150-155.
